Insecurity and Local Governance in Congo's South Kivu by Mushi, Ferdinand Mugumo
RESEARCH REPORT
Vol 2012 No 74
Insecurity and Local Governance in 
Congo’s South Kivu
Ferdinand Mugumo Mushi
March 2012
About IDS
The Institute of Development Studies is one of the world's leading charities for research, teaching and
communications on international development. Founded in 1966, the Institute enjoys an international
reputation based on the quality of its work and the rigour with which it applies academic skills to real
world challenges. Its purpose is to understand and explain the world, and to try to change it – to
influence as well as to inform.
IDS hosts five dynamic research programmes, five popular postgraduate courses, and a family of world-
class web-based knowledge services. These three spheres are integrated in a unique combination – as a
development knowledge hub, IDS is connected into and is a convenor of networks throughout the
world.
The Institute is home to approximately 80 researchers, 50 knowledge services staff, 50 support staff and
about 150 students at any one time. But the IDS community extends far beyond, encompassing an
extensive network of partners, former staff and students across the development community
worldwide. 
For further information on IDS publications and for a free catalogue, contact: 
IDS Communication Unit
Institute of Development Studies
Brighton BN1 9RE, UK
Tel: +44 (0) 1273 915637
Fax: +44 (0) 1273 621202
E-mail: bookshop@ids.ac.uk
Web: www.ids.ac.uk/ids/bookshop
IDS is a charitable company, limited by guarantee and registered in England (No. 877338).
1Insecurity and Local Governance
in Congo’s South Kivu
Ferdinand Mugumo Mushi
March 2012
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 74
Institute of Development Studies  Brighton BN1 9RE  UK
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 74
Insecurity and Local Governance in Congo’s South Kivu
Ferdinand Mugumo Mushi
IDS Research Report 74
First published by the Institute of Development Studies in March 2012
Cover photo: Sven Torfinn 
Photo caption: Democratic Republic of Congo, South Kivu: For years the people of Kitoga, a mountain village, 
have lived in isolation. Little is known about what has happened in the mountains of the ‘Hauts Plateaux' during
the war, but aid agencies are now trying to gain access to the area.
© Institute of Development Studies 2012
ISSN 2040-0217   ISBN 978-1-78118-049-5
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.
All rights reserved. Reproduction, copy, transmission, or translation of any part of this publication may
be made only under the following conditions:
• with the prior permission of the publisher; or
• with a licence from the Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd., 90 Tottenham Court Road, London
W1P 9HE, UK,
or from another national licensing agency; or
• under the terms set out below.
This publication is copyright, but may be reproduced by any method without fee for teaching or nonprofit
purposes, but not for resale. Formal permission is required for all such uses, but normally will be granted
immediately. For copying in any other circumstances, or for re-use in other publications, or for translation or
adaptation, prior written permission must be obtained from the publisher and a fee may be payable.
Available from:
Communications Unit
Institute of Development Studies
Brighton BN1 9RE, UK
Tel: +44 (0) 1273 915637
Fax: +44 (0) 1273 621202
Email: bookshop@ids.ac.uk
Web: www.ids.ac.uk/ids/bookshop
Typeset by Barbara Cheney, Bath, UK. Printed by Nexus, Brighton UK.
IDS is a charitable company limited by guarantee and registered in England (No. 877338).
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 74
2
3IDS RESEARCH REPORT 74
Summary
South Kivu Province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has experienced
recurrent wars for more than 15 years. This Research Report explores the way
local systems of governance and networking in South Kivu have been affected by
the civil war and the ways in which local communities have tried to cope with
chaos and the absence of the state.
Most community groups in South Kivu consider that violence and conflict were
imposed on them and dissociate themselves, as communities, from violence, this
being the work of some organised groups which should not be confused with the
communities themselves. The fundamental causes of the wars lie in the ways in
which Rwanda and Burundi, to different degrees, involved themselves with these
other actors.
The report also explores the role of various local organisations and groups in
conflict and post-conflict governance. Governance does not completely disappear
when the state collapses. Its structures remain hidden and in retreat, but ready to
sprout into existence again. This is especially true for the structures of local and
rural governance, and the networks of the church. 
South Kivu remains volatile and filled with suspicion. The behaviour of many
groups is determined by fear of another cycle of war. When some communities
can draw on external backing, the extension of such networks establishes another
dimension of distrust.
A post-conflict state has need of decentralisation. Multi-layered, networked
governance is a reality and is much less of a threat to viable states than might be
imagined. However, when the state is incapable of assuring the security of its own
population against external threats, when its own protective services engage in
arbitrary activities and live off the people, and when impunity goes unchecked, it is
difficult for social mechanisms and local institutions alone to substitute for the lack
of a functioning state.
Keywords: institutions; conflicts; communities; army; militia; civil society; South
Kivu; Democratic Republic of Congo.
Ferdinand Mugumo Mushi is Professor, Graduate in Political Science (PhD, UC
Berkeley 1983) and has taught at several Congolese Universities in Lubumbashi
and Kinshasa, and the Catholic Universities of Bukavu (UCB) and Congo (UCC).
He also has served as Advisor to the Prime Minister’s Office and the Office of the
President, and Administrator in some companies and public institutions of DRC
(CADECO, ONATRA, Court of Auditors, Office de Promotion des Petites et
Moyennes Entreprises du Congo/National Agency for Promoting Small and
Medium Scale Enterprises (OPEC)), while pursuing a career as a researcher and
consultant. His academic research in the field of politics, development
administration and the Congolese Civil Society led to the publication of several
articles and essays. He is currently working on the research project being
conducted by David Leonard at the Institute of Development Studies on ‘Security
in an Africa of Networked, Multilevel Governance’.
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Résumé
Certaines collectivités de la province du Sud Kivu ont connu des périodes de
guerres et de violences récurrentes et incessantes depuis plus de quinze ans.
L’article explore la façon dont les systèmes locaux de gouvernance et de réseau
dans le Sud-Kivu, en République démocratique du Congo, ont été touchés par la
guerre civile et l’impact de leur changement sur la refondation de la sécurité
humaine dans cette province. Il analyse le caractère plausible des explications
ayant trait à la culture, à l’exploitation des minéraux, aux réclamations sur la
possession et le contrôle des espaces de terre, et la recherche de participation
identitaire, et de représentation politique dans la récurrence des guerres et des
conflits endurants dans la région avant d’examiner les stratégies utilisées par les
communautés locales pour faire face au chaos et l’absence de l’état, ainsi que les
mécanismes d’auto défense qui ont contribué à leur survie.
La population de la province du Sud Kivu est composée de divers groupes
ethniques: le groupe Shi-Havu (Bashi Bahavu), le groupe Lega-Bembe (Barega,
Babembe), le groupe Fuliru-Vira (Bavira-Bafulero) et d’autres minorités ethniques.
L’autre groupe, appelé les minorités, comprend des groupes qui sont assimilés
intérieurement aux groupes dominants (Babuyu, Babuari), ou extérieurement à
d’autres nations (Barundi, Banyamulenge). La plupart des groupes communautaires
estiment que la violence et les conflits leurs  ont été imposés et ils se dissocient, en
tant que communautés, de la violence, ce qui est le travail de certains groupes
organisés qui ne devraient pas être confondus avec les communautés elles-mêmes.
Les causes fondamentales des conflits peuvent donc résider dans la façon dont le
gouvernement du Rwanda, sous Paul Kagame, a répondu aux affaires internes de
la RDC, en particulier, l’implication du Rwanda et du Burundi, à des degrés divers,
dans les jeux des acteurs locaux et communautés en faveur de leurs intérêts.
Le document explore également le rôle de diverses institutions et groupes
organisés dans les systèmes  de gouvernance instaurés durant les conflits et en
période post-conflit comme les milices locales, l’armée congolaise, les mutuelles à
caractère identitaire organisées dans les cités, les autorités traditionnelles, l’église
et la société civile au sens large. La gouvernance ne disparaît pas complètement
quand l’Etat s’effondre. Ses structures restent cachées et en retraite, mais prêtes
à germer à nouveau. Cela est vrai pour toutes les parties du gouvernement, mais
il est particulièrement vrai pour les structures de gouvernance locale et rurale. La
plupart des réseaux efficaces qui ont bénéficié aux communautés au Sud-Kivu
sont surtout  les réseaux de l’église.
Malgré la fin de violents affrontements et le retour d’un apaisement plus paisible
dans de nombreux espaces, la situation au Sud-Kivu demeure très instable et
remplie de suspicion. Le comportement de nombreux groupes est déterminé par
la crainte qu’un autre cycle de guerre est en préparation. 
Lorsque les collectivités peuvent s’appuyer sur le soutien et des ressources
provenant de l’extérieur, l’extension de ces réseaux pourrait établir une autre
dimension ou un axe qui maintien la peur et la méfiance entre les groupes et
limite leur capacité à coopérer pour trouver des solutions appropriées et
incontestées pour leur avenir commun.
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Un état post-conflit a besoin de beaucoup plus de décentralisation – ainsi que des
moyens pour y parvenir. Le réseau de gouvernance à plusieurs niveaux est une
réalité, certes, mais il constitue beaucoup moins une menace vitale pour les États
que l’on aurait pu l’imaginer. Toutefois, lorsque l’Etat est totalement incapable
d’assurer la sécurité de sa propre population contre les menaces extérieures,
quand ses propres services de protection s’engagent dans des activités arbitraires
et vivent sur la population, et quand l’impunité n’est pas maîtrisée, il est difficile
pour les mécanismes sociaux et les institutions locales seules de se substituer à
l’absence d’un organe de décision capable d’assumer le rôle du Léviathan.
Mots clés : institutions ; conflits ; communautés ; armée ; milices ; société
civile ; Sud Kivu; République Démocratique du Congo.
This paper was produced under the auspices of the RCUK Global Uncertainties
Programme on Security in an Africa of Networked, Multi-Level Governance.
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1 Indeed such a course has been recommended for the Congo by Autesserre (2010).
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1 Introduction 
Thomas Hobbes famously argued that life without the state is ‘nasty, brutish and
short’ (Hobbes 1939 [1651]). And when the government of Zaire finally collapsed
in the face of the 1996 revolutionary invasion from Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda,
the consequences for the peoples of eastern Congo were all of these disasters
and more. But if the national state collapsed for a time, what happened to local
governance? What role did its institutions play in coping with human insecurity?
How, in turn, were they affected by it? And what has been their part in rebuilding
governance? State reconstruction usually is approached from the top-down, with a
focus on core central government functions; in this paper I look at it from the
bottom-up.1
Local governance is defined by Anwar and Sana Shah (2007) as the formulation
and execution of collective action at the local level. Thus, it encompasses direct
and indirect roles of formal institutions of local government and governmental
hierarchies as well as the roles of informal norms, networks, community
organisations and neighbourhood associations in pursuing collective action by
defining the framework for citizen-citizen and citizen-state interactions, collective
decision-making and delivery of public services.
Understandably, institutions work better in situations of peace, when they result
from a long evolution over delineated administrative entities. Institutions of local
governance find anchorage in identifiable spaces. But what happens to institutions
and local governance when facing situations of war, conflict and delocalisation?
Some communities in the province of South Kivu have experienced periods of
recurrent wars and unending violence for more than 15 years. Did this fate help in
consolidating local traditional institutions by relying on them in order to find ways
of living without the state or supplementing its inabilities in sustaining peace,
stability and development? It is interesting to explore the way local systems of
governance and networking in South Kivu Province of the Democratic Republic of
Congo have been affected by the civil war and how their changes have affected
the recreation of human security in that province and eventually to detect what
governance structures and networks the various communities created or used in
trying to provide for their human security (broadly understood as including
physical security, shelter, health, food and the education of their children). 
What aspects of their social structures did they mobilise and which ones broke
down? What new structures were created? What kind of networks of relationships
with other external actors did they develop as part of their coping strategy? The
particular situation of South Kivu, during the revolutionary war of 1996, the
rebellion of 1998, the regime of the late President Laurent Kabila and the current
one of Joseph Kabila proves that life in South Kivu has been indeed uncertain,
challenging and deceitful over a long period. However, a combination of internal
actors and international ones, each one serving its own interests has contained
the deterioration of the social fabric to a certain degree and maintained existence
for a greater community.
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Furthermore, since the year 2003, efforts have been sustained for the reunification
of the country. Presidential and parliamentarian elections were held in 2006 and in
November 2011. How did these governance and network structures and their
changes affect the recreation of human security in South Kivu once the major
combatants at the national level had negotiated a peace? As the violent conflict
subsided, how were the various communities reincorporated into the larger
political order and how did they re-establish the various dimensions of their
human security? What social structures were central to the reincorporation and/ or
improvements in security? What networks were employed?
These questions matter for many reasons. Democracy and lasting peace in the
Democratic Republic of Congo depend on how local communities are reintegrated
in the larger Congolese nation and how they work together and share the future
despite their differences and early antagonisms. As has occurred before, a threat
to the security of a particular group because of its exclusion might also have
negative backlash on the security of other communities.
Policies dealing with early recovery and fragile states often consider that the
stabilisation of post conflict countries should usually initiate combined actions
aiming at humanitarian relief and at strengthening the authority of the state.
Although the institutional building of local communities is also listed on the
agenda, this process is sometimes little emphasised. The policy ends up ignoring
structures of local governance, initiated by local communities during the period
when the state was away. Yet, during the absence of the state, local communities
engineer ways of survival within themselves, using some old pre-existing
institutions, creating new ones and drawing on international resources.
South Kivu also is interesting because of the involvement of Rwanda and Burundi,
to different degrees, in the games local actors and communities play to foster their
interests. When communities can draw on external resources or backing, the
extension of such networks might establish another dimension or axis for
maintaining fear and distrust among groups and limit their ability to cooperate in
finding appropriate and uncontested solutions for their common future. The
interests of communities, or of some factions within them, and the interests of
states might differ at some point and maintain simmering conflict and tension
which on occasion may trigger again open confrontation.
2 The Shabunda territory could not be reached because of distance and accessibility and also because
of the reign of instability and continuing confrontation there between different militias, particularly the
local Maï Maï group called Raia Mutomboki and the Interahamwe. However, interviews were carried
out with prominent leaders from Shabunda living in Bukavu and coordinators of various local NGOs
who, while operating in Shabunda continue to live in Bukavu for security reasons. The island of Idjwi
was also excluded because it was a new territory, established during the period of war and did not
experience much change during that period because of its insular nature and the closeness of the ties
of its population with Rwanda. 
3 Prof. David K. Leonard from the Institute of Development Studies joined me and participated to the
second round of interviews during the month of October 2010.
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2 Methods 
This report is based on unstructured interviews throughout all of South Kivu
Province (save for the Shabunda Territory2 and the Island of Idjwi) during October
and November3 2010. Working out from the cities of Uvira and Bukavu visits to
collect data were made to the territories of Fizi, Mwenga, Walungu, Kabare and
Kalehe. 
Interviews were carried out with persons targeted because of their involvement in
various structures of local governance. They included traditional authorities, heads
of tribal organisations called ‘mutualités’, territorial administrators, representative
of churches, pastors, journalists, medics, and elected representatives seated in
the provincial and national assemblies. Some former members of Maï Maï groups
were also included. 
Interviews were also extended to influential members of the civil society at the
provincial level, particularly those whose organisations are recognised by
members of the community as having played a significant role in the structures of
local governance established during war and then after. Groups of local as well as
international non-governmental organisations as well as some offices of
MONUSCO were also able to provide valuable information. 
The report further draws on extensive knowledge gathered on the province through
documents. For example, the regular reports of the various territorial administrators
were read and fieldwork confirmed that they had been based on good intelligence.
Also consulted were various reports and articles written on the region and previous
research studies regarding closing the gap between humanitarian aid and early
recovery, and leadership and governance in the province. 
The report is structured as follows: the presentation starts with the administrative
configuration of South Kivu in order to provide an understanding of its local
structures of governance. It next discusses the background to the war and its
causes. Then afterwards, the paper describes major findings on governance,
security at large, and on networking, before drawing conclusions.
4 One needs only recall the mutiny of the army in 1960, the secession wars in various provinces of the
country (Katanga, Kivu, Kasai, 1960–1963), the Marxist backed rebellion led by Pierre Mulele in the
Bandundu, which emblazed all the provinces causing desolation, population displacement and the
destruction of infrastructure, from 1963 to 1967, the Schramme war in Kisangani in 1976 and so forth.
When analysts evoke also the Shaba wars (Kolwezi 1 and Kolwezi 2, plunder by the army in 1991 and
1993, the so-called liberation war (1996–1997) that culminated in the toppling of the dictatorial regime
of President Mobutu, and the invasion, of 1998 to 2002, whose consequences are still felt particularly
in the eastern part of the Congo.
5 Ministry of Planning, Piloting Unit of the DSRP process, Monograph of South Kivu, March 2005.
6 Provincial Direction of Statistics, Comprehensive Statistics of South Kivu in the year 2009.
7 Patches of insecurity still exist in most areas, particularly in Shabunda, Kalehe, Fizi, Mwenga and even
Walungu.
8 The state is subdivided into provinces: provinces are subdivided into territories; territories comprise either
collectivities ruled by traditional chiefs (called chieftaincies) or collectivities managed by designated
administrative authorities because they combine numerous non-homogeneous groups (called collectivités
secteurs). The constitution and the law recognise some autonomy for decentralised entities, which are the
province and the collectivity chieftaincy and the collectivity sector and to recognised cities. Decentralised
entities have the right to decide on certain matters as recognised by the constitution or by the law. They
are therefore governed by two bodies: an executive committee, and an elected assembly. Collectivities are
themselves subdivided into groupings of villages simply called ‘Groupements’. Groupings and territories
are simple extensions of either the state (territories) or collectivities. Groupings are themselves subdivided
into villages. Villages are not however parts of the formal Congolese administrative system. Actually most
villages are small in size and may regroup clans or extended families with blood linkage. A grouping is
therefore an entity within the collectivity. It is ruled according to tradition. The extension of territorial power
at the level of the grouping is the chef de poste d’encadrement. He represents the territorial administrator
and therefore the central authority of the Ministry of the Interior at the lowest level. State authority and
traditional authority therefore often coexist within the same entity, and they cooperate on certain grounds
or are associated in dealing with some issues.
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3 The administrative and
institutional configuration of
South Kivu
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been dominated over most of the
last decades by mismanagement, poor governance, recurrent insecurity and war,4
and institutional instability. In its east the province of South Kivu has experienced
major insecurities over the last 15 years. South (Sud) Kivu is located along Lake
Kivu, the Ruzizi River and a portion of Lake Tanganyika. South Kivu shares its
borders with the provinces of North Kivu, Maniema and Katanga, and three
countries: Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda. It covers a surface of 64,719 square
kilometres5 and its current population is estimated at 4,687,744 inhabitants in
2009.6 The industrial base of the economy is weak. The province is composed of
the territories of Kabare, Walungu, Kalehe, Shabunda, Mwenga, Uvira, Fizi and the
island of Idjwi in Lake Kivu.7 (See the map of the province at the end of this paper.)
The administrative architecture is composed of three layers: the provincial layer,
the intermediary layer and the community layer.8 According to the recent
constitution the provincial administration is a decentralised entity which shares
some powers with the national government and yet possesses some domains of
9 Except for chieftaincies, the assembly votes the executive committee and holds the power of its
dismissal. The provincial assembly also holds the power at the provincial level of designating senators
who represent the province at the national level, in the senate.
10 The 2006 electoral law has been recently changed. However, the president is elected by universal
ballot. In 2006, the law recognised the possibility of a second ballot in case neither of the candidates
was able to carry a simple majority of registered voters. During the 2011 election, whoever positions
himself as the one who got the highest score on the first round ballot wins the presidency. Elections of
senators are made at the level of provincial assembly. Senators represent provinces. The election of
representatives in legislative bodies is made according to the following: candidates may run as
independents or designated persons on a party list. In any electoral constituency parties are
represented according the proportion of all votes won by the sum of the members running on their list.
A candidate who has a high score gains enough points to winning not only his seat, but also helps to
pull up a lower scoring candidate of the same party until all the votes won by the party are distributed.
It is difficult and harder for independent runners to win and when they win high because they are
popular, the surplus score they were able to drain cannot be transferred because they are
independent, and this helps those running on the list of a party to position themselves better with the
pooling and sharing of votes. In this respect, unknown and non popular candidates may be qualified
as elected members of either the provincial assembly or the national assembly with the magic of the
pooling and sharing of votes earned by the party in a given constituency. It is the national electoral
commission at the end that determines who won and is qualified, after doing the counting, the pooling
and the sharing. The current system therefore decreases feelings of representation by average
citizens. Many don’t know for sure who won the election and is representing them.
11 Globally, the population considers that the nomination of various governors stems from Kinshasa’s
various electoral strategies as well as its international relations, particularly those with Rwanda, to
which most persons interviewed vest a de facto veto power over whatever politics evolves at the
provincial level in South Kivu since the 1996 and the 1998 wars. 
13
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regulation in which the province is self determined.9 The main political arena is the
provincial assembly in which deputies are represented according to their scoring
during local elections.10 The governor and the vice governor are elected by the
provincial assembly, which also possesses powers to approve their programmes
and/ or to dismiss them. 
The governor is the person who assumes the political leadership over the whole
province. From 1996 to 2006 the governor was designated as the representative
of the President of the Republic in the Province. He led all provincial services and
supervised public offices and services that hierarchically derived from the central
power, such as the intelligence services, the police and the army. Yet since
independence this position has mostly been volatile. According to Mwami Auguste
Mopipi Mukulumanya, from 1966 to 2010, the province witnessed the passage of
15 governors.
Since the 2006 elections, South Kivu has been governed by four successive
provincial governments. The provincial political arena has been dominated by
instability and the inability for the provincial government to build an autonomous
local coalition capable of tackling and seriously handling local and provincial
problems regarding insecurity and development in a more autonomous way.11
The city of Bukavu also constitutes a decentralised entity managed by the mayor
and his assistants. Since elections have not yet been organised at this level to
select an urban council which would elect the mayor, the occupancy of this position
depends on patrons and good favours within the hierarchical levels of the governate
of the province, the Minister of the Interior and the President of the Republic. 
12 Local and municipal elections planned in 2006 were postponed indefinitely. According to the new
electoral calendar, they are scheduled to be held in the year 2012.
13 The governor is post elected by the provincial assembly and is dismissed by the latter. The control of
the party from Kinshasa however determines that at the end, it is the party that presents the candidate
for election at the provincial level and who decides when he gets removed by the majority of the assembly.
14 Some collectivities however are not ruled by a Mwami. Their head is designated by the administrator
of the territory, in line with elections held by the council of the collectivity. Such an entity is referred to
as a ‘collectivity sector’, whereas the other most dominant unit is called a ‘collectivity-chieftaincy’.
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Territories are extended branches of the administration of the state, representing
the central government. Their officials are designated by the central Ministry of the
Interior, and included in the budgetary provisions of the state.12 Each territorial
administrator is assisted by two vice administrators: one is in charge of the
economy and the other of administration, security and political affairs. They
depend directly on the Ministry of the Interior, although they are obliged to
respond to the governor who represents at the same time the President in the
province, and the Ministry of the Interior.13 Administrators are also represented by
the chiefs of posts of supervision at a lower level of groupings. The mission of
territorial administrators consists in representing the state at the local level and
supervising the functioning of collectivities, but they are mostly deprived of the
means of functioning in an independent manner. At a lower level stands traditional
powers exercised at the level of chieftaincies, also called collectivities. 
Traditional authorities have been associated in the management of their entities
since the colonial period. The collectivity constitutes an entity within the territory
grouping one culturally homogeneous community whose powerholder is decided
according to ethnic traditions and recognised or formalised by the state following
the application of traditional rules. The head of the collectivity carries the
traditional title of Mwami (king). Succession is done according to traditional rules
pertaining to each group. The Mwami (pl. Bami) is the guarantor of tradition. 
The collectivity is subdivided into ‘Groupements’ which extend traditional power at
the level of regrouped villages, which are themselves supervised by chiefs of
villages that bear different names according to each chieftaincy: Bagula,
Bashamuka, Barhambo, etc. It is worth mentioning that Territorial Administrators
and their assistants who are located in rural areas need to govern with traditional
chiefs and live in harmony with them if they want to be obeyed by the local
population. Most of the time Administrators are drawn from outside the community
and the real power holders at the collectivity levels are the Bami.14
Challenges to traditional authorities come from various new elites. The elite
concept is used here in its sociological and global understanding: political actors,
renowned businessmen and representatives of various corporations, intellectuals,
and leaders of churches and of non-governmental organisations who are
recognised as notabilities within their respective groups, whether they come from
within the province or elsewhere, whether they live there or not. Basically most of
them exhibit commendable credentials which make them a group on which their
community relies as ambassadors for the defence of their interests and of their
wellbeing and linkages with the outside world. 
15 One needs to make a few remarks also about the new rich persons. They draw their standing from the
following resources: plantations left by Belgians of quinquina, tea and coffee along with the exploitation
of timber, the trade of minerals, particularly gold and coltan, and the owning of real estate within the
city. In all cases their wealth, as long as it is still visible, commands respect and following. An
expression in the Mashi language says that people accept as rulers those who can provide and
dispense to them materiel gains. ‘Nfune Bashiga’. Like traditional chiefs, new rich persons also
capitalise on their wealth in order to gain access to political power. They perceive it as good and as a
necessity in the long-run for securing protection for their various ventures and also for extending
peacefully their activities by protecting them from administrative and police harassment. 
16 They serve the province in accordance with geographical criteria of proximity. Given the distances, the
means of communication, the harshness of the terrain, and the long-lasting insecurity, this judicial
architecture is definitely wanting in covering efficiently the entire space of Kivu and guaranteeing
access to due process of law to everyone.
17 In rural areas, the architecture in South Kivu comprises territorial tribunals and principal collectivity’s
tribunals. The number reported in 2004 comprises seven tribunals organised by the territory and
22 tribunals organised by collectivities. Besides the ones located mostly at the territory headquarters
and still very far from the population, there is an account of 164 secondary or associated tribunals
corresponding to the 164 groupings which exist in the province.
15
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Elites in South Kivu also include career civil servants and politicians, moral
leaders from various churches, renowned intellectuals, renowned businessmen,15
renowned members of the civil society, renowned members of the army and of
various militias who helped in defending their territory during troubled periods, etc.
They constitute a heterogeneous group, coming from different backgrounds and
holding different educational qualifications.
Other leadership present in the local governance arena derive from a transitional
or temporary presence in the region. These include humanitarian agents within
the health system and those providing various social services during periods of
duress. Other elites that participate in the management of the province can be
considered outsiders, i.e. they may not be natives of Kivu, but they control
resources which are valuable to the nation and the province, such as the armed
forces, the police, information services, and the public administration. In this
respect, MONUC and MONUSCO commanders, directors of public enterprises,
financial private and public services, tax collecting agencies, etc., each one within
his/ her own realm, controls a parcel of power and resources that may be used
positively or negatively, according to rule or in an informal manner, to secure and
build status for him/herself within the immediate surrounding community. 
The provincial judiciary system also fits into the hierarchy established by the state.
The Supreme Court is unique and accessible only in Kinshasa. The highest court
in the province is the Court of Appeal, followed directly by the High Court and the
Peace Tribunal. The Court of Appeal operates in Bukavu, the capital city of the
province, along with the Prosecutor General (Parquet Général). Subsequently,
they are relayed by only two first instance tribunals and prosecution offices in
Bukavu and Uvira. Secondary tribunals have been de-concentrated in order to
make the distance somewhat more manageable.16 
The Tribunal of Peace stands at the lower level of justice administration. Tribunals
of Peace are supposed to be closer to the people and legally are to gradually
replace urban and city tribunals (in Bukavu, Kadutu and Uvira) and traditional
tribunals in the rural areas.17 Administrative authorities like the territorial
18 The province is subdivided into five sanitary districts, divided into 34 health zones and 503 health
centres. This architecture comprises also one provincial hospital, one university hospital, 27 general
reference hospitals, and 30 hospital centres.
19 One might think that the health delivery mechanisms are in place and well functioning. It is important
to notice however that on the south/Uvira health districts, four health zones did not yet possess a
general reference hospital, nor any hospital centre, although for Minembwe and Itombwe, new
hospitals were being constructed with the financial help and assistance of international partners like
the International Rescue Committee (IRC), and AVSI. In Kimbi Lulenge, the hospital centre operates
from the compound of a Catholic Church. The functioning of most other health centres in different
zones was disturbed by looting and recurrent attacks from armed groups. 
20 Under the educational convention of 26 February 1977, the state returned previously nationalised
confessional schools to the management of their religious founders on behalf of and under the
financing of the state. Conventioned schools are therefore schools that are admitted to that
convention, managed by confessional groups, and yet financed for their functioning by a substantial
subvention from the state for the payment of the personnel and the provision for functioning expenses.
There are four confessional types of school conventions according to their denomination: The Catholic;
the Protestant; the Kimbaguist; and the Islamic. The administration of these schools is carried out
through four territorial subdivisions.
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administrator, the chief of a collectivity (meaning the Mwami) and the chief of the
grouping (groupement) combine at the same time the role of administrator and judge. 
The provincial health system is structured into five sanitary districts.18 Each
sanitary district is subdivided into health zones and each health zone comprises at
least one or more reference hospital and health centres.19 The churches play a
prominent role in providing the various health services, which was particularly
important when the purely state health system collapsed in the war. 
The provincial system of maternal [pre-school], primary, technical, professional
and special education relies on public and private initiative. The public or official
mode comprises public schools owned and managed under the form of public
services, and public schools managed under a convention signed by various
religious groups.20
Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo is mostly perceived in two manners:
the defence of the integrity of the territory and consequently the sovereignty of the
state, from invasion and external threats, and the maintenance of law and order
within its space in order to permit the free and harmonious flow of citizens and
their belongings. The President of the Republic is almost solely responsible for
security issues. In a broader way, security services comprise the army, the police,
and the intelligence and information-gathering services such as the National
Security Council (CNS), the National Information-gathering Agency (ANR). The
General Direction of Migrations (DGM), military information services and the
police of frontiers may also be considered as actors in the realm of security at the
provincial level.
21 Estimates vary. The informal mining sector is the largest employer in South Kivu and even in North
Kivu. Persons identified by the division of mining in South Kivu Province and owning a card as
recognized mine diggers for either gold or cassiterite amounted to 100,000. (Ministère des Mines,
Province du Sud Kivu: Rapport Général des Etats de lieux de la Division Provinciale des Mines et
Géologie, 2008). Another study considers that there are about 150,000 diggers operating in South
Kivu, and about 200,000 in North Kivu: (see Briefing Note: Artisanal Mining in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, August 2007 (version 1.3) DRC Donor coordination meeting facilitated by CASM (Kinshasa
15–17 August 2007), p.2 and 4. Further, in a very interesting study published by the University of 
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4 Background to the wars and their
causes 
4.1 Culture 
Explanations abound for the recurrent wars in the eastern provinces of the DRC.
Some outside observers claim the region possesses a culture that is oriented
toward violence, a vision that is in contradiction, however, with the peaceful nature
of most communities living in the area, each one claiming self-defence as the only
element which may at times explain its participation in any kind of violence or
aggression against another group. 
Most community groups consider that violence and conflict were imposed on them
and they dissociate themselves, as communities, from violence, this being the
work of some organised groups which should not be confused with the communities
themselves. The victims of violence, the common population which only wants to
live in peace, be they Banyamulenge, Bashi, Bafuliru, Babembe or Barega, claim
their recognition as peaceful communities. 
The vacuum of authority is another reason given to explain the continuation of
violence. One agrees however with Autesserre that a lack of authority does not
mean people will immediately begin killing and raping each other and that other
mechanisms of social control aside from the state prevent the translation of
tensions into intense fighting. Even in the context of civil wars, conflicts do not
always result in indiscriminate violence (Autesserre 2010). 
4.2 Minerals 
The presence in the region of substantial mineral deposits which could be used to
finance military adventures and enrich the countries and individuals involved, is
also an important fact to take into account (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2000).
Indeed, South Kivu is endowed with minerals like gold, cassiterite, coltan and
wolfram, exploited on an artisanal basis. Yet, the presence of minerals by itself
does not suffice to explain the maintenance of violence and its escalation into a
security issue among communities. The youth in search earning a living is
increasingly practicing internal migration within the borders of the province, and
across, to cater for themselves and their families, without any problem among
them. They form instead the army of diggers utilised by various military forces in
the region.21 Much or even possibly most of their production is smuggled to
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Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and even Kenya,22 and mostly the minerals are
produced in those areas of persistent insecurity due to the presence of
Interahamwe and other foreign militias.23 This explanation therefore points toward
international intrusion.
4.3 Rwanda and Rwandaphones 
The fundamental causes of the wars may therefore lie in the ways in which the
Government of Rwanda, under Paul Kagame, has responded to matters in the
DRC. At first, the cause of waging war was the presence of large numbers of Hutu
refugees from Rwanda in South Kivu. They had fled to Congo after the Hutu
genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus and the victory of the Tutsi Rwanda
Patriotic Front (RPF). The refugees included not only civilians and their families
but also members of the previous Rwandan army and of the Hutu militia (the
Interahamwe), who had not been disarmed at the border. The refugees were
packed by the International Community into camps near to the Rwandan border,
from whence its militia continued to organise minor intrusions into Rwanda in
1995/6 and planned its return to topple the RPF regime. The tracking down of
armed Hutu refugees has given legitimacy to the across border adventure of
Rwanda in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the occupation of its eastern
part. But as the overthrow of the Mobutu government of Zaire and the continued
involvement of Rwandaphone forces in eastern Congo since that time
demonstrate, the issues that provoked Kagame’s attention went well beyond the
armed Interahamwe refugees.
German and Belgian colonialism interrupted a period of state consolidation and
territorial expansion on the part of Rwanda and Burundi, which are closely related
linguistically and socially. The dynamics of these states had led by the mid-
nineteenth century to the establishment of Barundi and Rwandaphone Tutsis in what
became the South Kivu province of the Belgian Congo – the former in the Ruzizi
plains near Uvira and the latter in the highlands above Lake Tanganyika, eventually
in Shabunda. Many times Barundi and Banyarwanda were trying to escape from the
centralising power of their states, but their presence often was used by their
monarchs later for an expansion of borders (Newbury 1988). This process was
interrupted by colonialism, however. In addition, in the 1930s Belgium encouraged
21 (cont.) Antwerp, in an article, ‘La filière stannifère artisanale au Sud Kivu, cas du coltan et de la
cassiterite, in L’Afrique des Grands Lacs 2008–2009’, p.216, provides even a higher estimate:
200,000 persons. Indeed, according to Adamon Ndungu Mukasa and Janvier Kilosho Buraye, in the
above mentioned article, it is difficult and risky today to give an exact number of people working in the
sector of artisanal mining in the DRC, but for the estimated 2,000,000 workers in this sector, 200,000
among them are assumed to work in South Kivu.
22 A World Bank report confirms the intensity of mineral smuggling from Congo to neighbouring
countries, but provides no clear data on the volume and value of this process. See: La Banque
Mondiale: RDC, La bonne gouvernance dans le secteur des mines comme facteur de croissance,
Département des hydrocarbures, des industries extractives et des produits chimiques, p 65.
23 It is reported that a company called TRANSAFRIKA discovered gold in Rwanda for the first time in
2008, in the Byumba concession. Other explorations are under way. But even before that period the
export of minerals by private companies (buyers) established in Rwanda contributed to the Rwandan
balance of payment. 
24 Unfortunately, during the 1996 war, the Banyamulenge sided early with the rebellious army of Laurent
Désiré Kabila, probably under the instigation of the larger Rwandan community in Rwanda and in
Kivu. Other groups joined later after being opposed to what they termed the war of the Banyamulenge
requesting a territory of their own. The experience of the first war led the Banyamulenge to split up
during the 1998 war led by the RCD. Some of them remained loyal to the Congolese state, others
joined in the new rebellion. Therefore, the main issue of conflict over the last decade in South Kivu is
the intrusion of Rwanda into Congolese politics and affairs and its manipulation of some local groups
against others.
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the new settlement of Hutus labourers from densely populated Rwanda in the
Masisi area of North Kivu province. Although population movement has been a
constant in African history (and indeed of the world) the presence of these
Rwandaphone enclaves in Congo had not become socially or administratively
stabilised at the time of independence. The Tutsi numbers in Congo probably were
increased after the 1959 revolution in Rwanda brought the Hutus to power there.
The presence of these Banyarwanda and Barundi in Congo became a part of the
concerns of Rwanda and to a lesser extent Burundi from 1996.
Congolese Rwandaphones (in South Kivu generally known as Banyamulenge)
were among Kagame’s RPF forces when they first invaded Rwanda. They also
responded positively to the call of President Kagame for the rebuilding and
resettlement of Rwanda after the genocide, and subsequently joined in the AFDL
rebellion that toppled Mobutu in 1996.24 What explains the participation of
Congolese Rwandaphones in these military struggles with other Congolese and
the unusual antagonism felt toward them by their neighbours?
Of course there are tensions between other ethnic groups in South Kivu, driven by
competition for the appropriation of the state and its favours and over the issue of
land. Political representation in the game of power is itself dependent on the
possession of a territorial space which a group might claim as its own exclusive
domain. So the two issues are not unrelated – but it is only for the Rwandaphones
that they have led to war. 
Bosco Muchukiwa advances another internal dimension or source of conflict that
seems to be appropriate in the plains of Ruzizi: the unequal stabilisation of ethnic
entities into established and durable administrative spaces during the colonial
period. He postulates that the reconfiguration of ethnic territories into
administrative entities and their transition or integration into state territory is the
fundamental issue of the political dynamics of communities which explains the
persistence of local conflicts in the territory of Uvira. He believes that the
integration of communities in the state space is problematic and is a source of
conflict between ethnic groups, particularly between the Banyamulenge and the
Babembe (Muchukiwa 2006: 1–4). It is therefore important to devote some words
on the claims of communities over land. 
25 During the colonial era, lands inhabited by indigenous communities were protected by law. Any other
lands belonged to King Leopold and after him to the colony. However, in 1969, Mobutu decided under
the Law Bakajika that all land belonged to the state. Ever since, the state claims exclusive rights over
all unutilised land (previously held by major companies which had received wide concessions under
colonial rule as well as by traditional chiefs). Despite that law, traditional chiefs continue to exercise
rule over the land that they claim as belonging to their tribe by custom. Yet formally these lands were
delineated in 1969 as territories within the new state rather than territories belonging exclusively to
homogeneous groups.
26 However, they do have internal contests over succession to their chieftaincy.
27 Banyamulenge are increasingly identified as a separate group with its own identity, an identity which is
drawn from its long autarkical life on the high plateaus of the chain of Mitumba.
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4.4 Claims of communities over land
The population of the province of South Kivu is composed of various ethnic
groups. Each group claims a portion of land as its own upon which it should
possess implicit rights of admittance and exclusion.25 South Kivu is usually
considered to be comprised of four ethnic groups: the Shi-Havu group (Bashi-
Bahavu), the Lega-Bembe group (Barega, Babembe), the Fuliru-Vira (Bavira-
Bafulero) group and other ethnic minorities. Most political action since
independence involves stable coalitions or compromises between the first three.
Their leaders, although at times antagonists, have developed permanent ways of
collaborating and negotiating when it comes to politicking either at the national
level or the sharing of power at the provincial levels.
The other group, termed minorities, comprises groups that are assimilated
internally to dominant groups, or externally to other nations. The Banyintu, for
example, are sometimes considered to belong to a wider Bashi ethnic group or to
be a population bridge linking the Bashi and Barega. This assimilation means that
they can easily evolve in the Lega-Bembe group as well as the Shi-Havu group.
They claim family ties in both groups. They form a link between the territory of
Mwenga and the territory of Walungu. The Babuyu and Babuari evolved mostly in
the province of Fizi, basically on the peninsula of Ubwari. Their identity as a group
is noticeable only in the political arena of Fizi. However, in relation to other larger
groups, they find assimilation within the Babembe group.
The Barundi and Banyamulenge find their origin in the former kingdoms of
Burundi and Rwanda. However the perception of their reality is different from the
other groups. The Barundi were well established in the Ruzizi plain. They gained
formal status as a collectivity and chiefdom in 1928. Although they live near the
Ruzizi River, claim families and relatives on both sides of the same river, in
Burundi and in Congo, they live in harmony with other groups with full recognition
and stable relations.26
The Banyamulenge, on the other hand, do not manifest a similar integration. As
already noted, the Banyamulenge were present in Congo in the pre-colonial
periods and are basically composed of Tutsi or are assimilated to them. The
identity of the Banyamulenge27 has remained fluid because of recent migrations of
other Rwandese populations in DRC during the conflicts around independence
and in Rwanda, and recurrent opposition between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda.
Their quest for a personalised identity for a better integration into South Kivu life
28 Until the 1920s the Banyamulenge had paid tribute to the Mwami/king of the Babembe, and although
Babembe land is not scarce the group resents the loss of recognition of its suzerainty.
29 The popular discourse among the other groups alleges that the objective of the formation of
Minembwe was to annex the territory to Rwanda. The idea of annexation obviously implies that a
portion of Minembwe touches Rwanda, which of course it doesn’t. Thus indeed, the creation of a
Banyamulenge territory in the Shabunda or Mwenga highlands would actually not seem a step toward
annexation but rather an alternative to it. However, for the population from other groups, that territory
would be used in the long run by Rwanda to claim rights over the provinces of North and South Kivu,
and they would facilitate Rwandan infiltration. There is however a serious statistical gap about their
numbers. Muchukiwa considers that their number is currently below 100,000 persons since they could
not even gain by themselves a seat in the national assembly during elections held in 2006. One might
argue that they had become disillusioned with their political leaders at that time. However, they could
vote for new ones because it is hard to imagine they could vote for any member of another competing
ethnic group when they have been yearning so much for political representation, like all other ethnic
groups for the same matter.
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and a clear distinction from their Rwandan origins has been diversely
misperceived as a way of changing history or seeking to claim a portion of lands
which belong to other ethnic groups.28
At present the Banyamulenge don’t formally posses an administrative entity or
collectivity which they may claim as their own and no uncontested land belonging
to the groups as a whole. However, in 1998, during the rule over the territory of
the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), there was an
administrative territory of Minembwe erected in favour of the Banyamulenge, but it
did not survive the reunification of Congo after the Sun City accords of 2003. 
The territory of Minembwe which they created was composed by assembling portions
of lands drawn from three neighbouring territories: Uvira, Fizi, and Mwenga, which
allegedly the Banyamulenge group could claim as theirs because numerically they
are the main inhabitants of the area. The new territory was composed by drawing the
grouping of Bidjombo in the Territory of Uvira, the Collectivity of Lulenge in the
territory of Fizi and another portion of the Territory of Mwenga called the grouping of
Itombwe. Although in fact Banyamulenge do indeed represent large portions of the
populations of most of these areas, as soon as the reunification occurred, portions of
this new territory were unanimously reclaimed by the leadership of the original
territories, leaving all the Banyamulenge community unhappy at having reaped no
tangible benefits from a war which bore their name (the Banyamulenge war).29
As a pastoralist group, the Banyamulenge cannot be located at one single space.
They live in scattered settlements, some among in the chieftaincy of Kaziba
(Walungu territory), others in Uvira, others in Mwenga and also in Fizi. This
doesn’t help them in constituting a political force capable of competing with other
groups in the electoral process and winning seats in assemblies and parliaments.
Although every ethnic group is considered to be a minority in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, the Banyamulenge can be indeed considered as a minority
because they lived isolated areas for a long time from other groups.
Although they are now changing due to increased contacts with other groups
during the war period and then after, the concern for the Banyamulenge has long
been how to protect their way of life and cultural values against the invasion of
others, particularly on how to graze their cattle during periods of dry season, and
30 The patriarchs of the Banyamulenge recall that one settler called Reagan had a farm over the hills in
the area in which the Banyamulenge live. During the 1963 Mulele rebellion the Simba (as they were
called) in this area went on feeding themselves on the cattle of this settler until his entire farm was
looted. At first, the Banyamulenge attempted to associate with the rebellion against the state together
with the other communities, the Bembe, the Fuliru and the Vira who massively joined it. But when the
other groups started to feed themselves on the Banyamulenge’s own herds, they shifted alliance and
became the best servants of the Congolese national army. Their knowledge of the corridors of the
mountains helped the Congolese army to regain control over these spaces and the rebellion was
crushed with their help. This left a feeling of betrayal among the other groups who ever since have
considered all Banyamulenge as traitors and people who do not respect their word. 
31 Even the city of Minembwe centre has attracted numerous youngsters who increasingly are abandoning
life in hard conditions in the mountains catering for the herds of their families; they are now voluntarily
seeking education, electricity communication and modernity in whatever image it provides. 
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to protect them from diseases and theft by other groups. Their involvement in
politics and wars was determined by this concern during the period of
independence, when the division with other groups was heightened.30
Note in all of this that the issue for the Banyamulenge and their neighbours is not
access to land but jurisdiction over it. The areas in contest are not ones in which
land is scarce, and in any case the Banyamulenge are already using them without
serious challenge. The issue instead is who has suzerainty over the land and
whether the Banyamulenge have their own formal administrative territory, for
these niceties determine recognition by the state and the ability to participate
effectively in its elections and decision-making processes.
5 War and governance
5.1 Coping with chaos
Communities coped with the multiple dimensions of their human security with
great difficulty during the war, but they did remain intact as communities and their
pre-war (traditional) leadership structures continued to provide whatever degree of
governance response was possible after the central state apparatus disappeared. 
Individual families used kinship mechanisms to cater for their security. Family,
children and wives for some were sent to secure places, which may be hidden
and known only by the members of the group and whose access is unlikely from
the outsider because of fear and ignorance and danger. The Barega identified
secure areas in the forests and built what are called lubunga where they retreated
until the danger was gone. Babembe from Baraka and Fizi migrated to Kigoma in
Tanzania, and to the peninsula of Ubwari. The Bahavu of Kalehe found refuge on
the island of Idjwi and others went to scattered islands on Lake Kivu. Even among
the Banyamulenge, those who had family ties in Kigali or other places in Rwanda
sent their families there. 
Displacement to major cities like Bukavu and Uvira or areas which are secured by
neutral armies such as the MONUSCO also increased.31 Small towns along the
road in the plains of Ruzizi, in Nyangezi, Kabare and Walungu, have increased
32 The word migrant is not fully appropriate. The correct phrase would be internally displaced families in
the same ethnic group. Therefore they share the same governance structures. They have to obey the
governance mechanisms prevailing at the place to which they migrate. Most chiefs interviewed were
happy to report that their communities were heterogeneous and that everybody lived peacefully.
Except during periods of intercommunal conflict where each group considers the other group as being
the enemy, integration in South Kivu does not pose a problem to communities provided the new
migrant obeys by the rules of first recognising the local traditional ruler and seeking his protection.
Living in a village without being previously identified by the chief, whoever he may be, is suspicious
and can lead to insecurity. Moving in the Bushi area does not lead people to constitute refugee camps.
It is always possible to find a clan relative or some other person of good will who will provide refuge. 
33 Families who remain in the mountains are constantly harassed by unidentified armed groups which
may be occupation armies which are free to operate in those abandoned areas.
34 These strategies had unfortunate future consequences for these communities and on the status of
women. Children of mixed blood born out of the Interahamwe or Tutsi Banyamulenge liaisons are easily
identified. There are many such now wandering in the territories of Walungu (at least 40,000 identified),
in the territory of Shabunda, and the chieftaincies of Bunyakiri, Luhwinja and so forth. More than
15 years of the presence of Interahamwe in the eastern part of Congo has left a mark in changing the
colouration of populations in the remote places of South Kivu, most often in forested areas.
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the number of their new migrants,32 leaving the interior depopulated and therefore
propitious for occupation.33
Others made a choice of joining one of the belligerent groups by the creation of a
stable relation with them, for example by providing either a daughter to high
ranking officers in exchange for security or a son as a new recruit soldier for a
militia. The territory of Shabunda, the region of Kaniola and the chieftaincy of
Burhinyi which are currently under the control of the Interahamwe mostly
employed these strategies.34
5.2 Self-defence
Self-defence movements also sprung up in all communities under various labels
like the Maï Maï, Ngumino Forces (FRF), the Mudundu 40, etc. for providing
security to their communities. The populations of South Kivu were stung by the
defeat of the Congolese army in 1996 against Rwandan troops. As soon as the
population observed the disintegration of the Congolese State’s army and the fact
that the Interahamwe, its ally, were left alone to curb the advance of the Rwandan
army on their respective territories, the population decided to take matters of
defending the motherland in their own hands as in ancient times. This movement
was supported by the diasporas and encouraged by most traditional chiefs. 
When communities understood, from the propaganda of the AFDL, that the
belligerents were only looking for a passage and not coming for occupation, then
Laurent Kabila’s allied forces from Rwanda gradually received the support of local
communities and changed its image from Rwandan intruders to a revolutionary
force. Most organised resistance groups disbanded and some of them joined the
troops of Laurent Désiré Kabila all the way to Kinshasa. Resistance was most
active for the Babembe Maï Maï and continued after other militias had agreed to
incorporation into a reorganised Congolese army.
35 Actually, the Mudundu 40 descended on the city of Bukavu and harassed Nkundabatware’s troops
when Congolese soldiers commanded by Mbuza Mabe were again on the retreat. It is after negotiating
with MONUSCO that they allowed these troops to leave Bukavu, some of them through a corridor
leading south to Kamanyola through the escarpments of Ngomo. Mudundu 40 considers that it did an
efficient job in defending its area by using the same weapons that their enemy had provided to them
during their pseudo collaboration.
36 Registered massacres on the road to Mwenga and on the roads to Fizi are a testimony of how the
idea of vengeance and the assurance of impunity during disputed sovereignty left the soldier to
become the ruler on the surface of land (or parcel of land). Places where innocent civilians suffered
during the RCD period because of the resistance of Maï Maï include Kasika, Makobola, Katogota, and
even Mwenga, where women were buried alive because they were considered to have been sorcerers
who prepared medicine to make the Maï Maï invincible and fearless.
37 Unfortunately, massacres committed by Rwandan soldiers, or by other persons who joined in this
adventure, were indiscriminately associated with the Banyamulenge, reinforcing the antagonism of
other communities and their image as a heartless people.
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Populations returned to the bush to reorganise networks of popular self-defence
mostly after the second rebellion led by the RCD, which was the Rwandan branch
of AFDL, which was unhappy about the way Kabila handled its relations with them. 
The forces of local resistance were efficient in destabilising the Rwandan army.
The power of AFDL did not remain unchallenged. It controlled the roads but there
are many parts throughout the province which remained hostile to them. To
counter the action of the Maï Maï resistance groups, the Rwandan army,
considering the evidence that it could not be everywhere and control all events,
tried to organise its own militia, called local defence, in order to break the action of
various Maï Maï groups. These groups seem to have been better equipped in
Luhwinja and Kaziba than elsewhere, probably because some of their leaders
joined into the RCD rebellion.
Most of these groups evolved with no provincial coordination until the time in 1998
when the Kinshasa government, which had completely lost control in the province,
tried to unify them, supply military equipment, and help them to continue to resist
from the bush. This governmental intrusion may have led to leadership
competition among the groups.
The group called the Mudundu 40 protected its territory of Walungu with weapons
supplied to it by Rwanda in a deal that it would establish a barrier against the
Interahamwe. They maintained peace with RCD until the day in 2004 when the
latter’s troops, led by Mutebusi and Nkundabatware, invaded Bukavu.35
Although they were efficient in harassing and embarrassing Rwandan troops, the
population suffered many massacres during the process. If Rwandan soldiers
suffered a heavy loss nearby in confrontation against the Maï Maï, they would
return to take revenge on those presumed to be the latter’s supporters.36 Entire
villages were burnt to the ground, populations were massacred without distinction
for having collaborated with the Maï Maï and all this made life uncertain and
brutally short for those who happened to be there at the wrong time. The more
massacres were perpetrated, the more the Maï Maï felt compelled to resist and to
liberate their lands.37
38 The Bami Ntambuka and Rubenga are reported to have been mostly pacifists by their peers.
39 Some heroic women who traded with Burundi were able to link these groups in the forest with the
outside world. They supplied food to resistance groups as well as ammunition bought from
neighbouring countries. Congolese soldiers who defected and joined the Maï Maï also organised
themselves into networks for supplying ammunitions from the regular army. 
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These forces were less active in the north of South Kivu Province, where there
was little history of conflict with Rwandaphones (Banyamulenge) and where
traditional leaders were more likely to seek accommodation with Rwandan (and
Burundian) forces as they passed through to attack refugee camps and to secure
a hold on the DRC and its mineral resources. The two Bami of the Bahavu who
are located on the island of Idjwi simply chose a more peaceful way of
cooperating with the Rwandan army. They were compelled to that strategy,
because of the mixed nature of populations living on the island and the particular
relations they have with Rwanda due to proximity.38
5.3 Militia materiel 
Those groups that were able to gain control over mines in the interior of the Kivus
were able to use them to purchase munitions and other supplies. Most of the
mining areas were captured by the armies of Rwanda and (in North Kivu) Uganda
and the continuing export of their minerals (even when produced by the artisanal
activities of Congolese miners) supports their military budgets. The Rwandaphone
militias have been provided with military support and materiel from Rwanda (and
Burundi in the early stages.) 
The opposing militias received some support from Congolese patrons (typically fellow
ethnics in the capital) or, more usually, relied on raiding. The proximity of Tanzania
and the resistance of Maï Maï on the peninsula of Ubwari facilitated the group’s
getting supplies, including ammunition, from Tanzania. The Bavira and Bafuliru
considered that they mostly used mystical powers to neutralise their enemies and
seize their weapons. Since these groups were unable to secure enough ammunition
they concentrated on using elite shooters in order not to waste the ammunition.39
The national government in Kinshasa may also have been able to parachute some
weapons ammunitions and communication means through the air mostly in the
territories of Shabunda and in other areas in Walungu and Mwenga. 
6 Post-conflict local governance
6.1 Militias 
Around the world it is common for those who play prominent roles in a war to then
claim civilian leadership positions when it is over. The Maï Maï developed network
relations which involved their communities, the state in Kinshasa (through satellite
telephone) and with known politicians from their region in Kinshasa and elsewhere.
Depending on the period, most of them also developed network solidarities with
some groups of Interahamwe militia who were stationed in their area, as they
40 It is Congolese politicians or bureaucrats who gained in using the Maï Maï to foster their political
existence.
41 Those who were unhappy with the deal like Zabuloni and Yakutumba returned to continue resistance
in their native areas. 
42 It is hard, yet not impossible, to be elected without the backing of the traditional village the politician
comes from or claims as their place of origin. And that backing may depend on the correct line for
voting or word order given by traditional chiefs. The fourth way for chiefs of using their traditional
capital is to enter into a clientele position with a higher authority in an electoral bond. They provide
public support to a higher person by almost selling him the votes of his subjects, whose support for a
given camp is determined by the position taken by their traditional chief. This may be done in
expectation of a positive outcome for the chief, his immediate relatives or the community. 
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perceived them as having a common agenda of resisting Rwandan occupation. In
some cases the latter relations deteriorated, after demobilisation, into new groups
exerting negative gang activities, particularly in remote areas. An example is the
RASTA phenomenon, which exercised control, violence and enduring insecurity in
Nindja and Kaniola on the outskirts of the territories of Walungu and Kabare (UPDI
and IVP 2009: 9). Despite the valuable role played by the local militias during the
war proper, the abuses engaged in by some of their members have kept all but a
few of their leaders from assuming civilian leadership roles in post-conflict Congo –
even those who did cooperate with their demobilisation. Most Maï Maï from Kivu
did not join into politics.40 Those true Mai Mai who gained anything from the war
joined in the Congolese army, where some of them became officers.41 Most of the
youth who joined the Maï Maï movement did not have any ambition other than
defending their motherland against the invaders or occupiers. 
6.2 Traditional authorities
The institutions of chieftaincy and kingship are still quite popular and were easily
and universally re-established after the war when leaders who had fled then
returned. Although the power of traditional chiefs is still respected, there are a
number of traditional leaders who are developing new venues of power attached to
their roles within a larger polity. This has brought many chiefs to reconsider their
role and to use traditional capital in order to provide new venues for themselves,
their offspring and closely related members of their families, or to consolidate their
own traditional bargaining position in the shaping of the political arena at the
national and provincial level. They are represented in the local assembly, they run
for election to the national assembly, they provide patronage to their relatives or
enter into other deals with politicians.42 Most of the bami no longer live permanently
in their villages. They possess a new home in Bukavu or nearby cities.
6.3 Local justice
Despite the resurrection of chieftaincy and its popularity, many of the features of
Native Administration that made it so strong have been weakened. The Native
Administration courts now compete with alternative dispute resolution agencies
created by donor-financed NGOs during the war. When these new structures are
paired with the newly extended magistrates’ courts they appear to be an
increasingly preferred alternative for most people.
43 During the war, most traditional courts did not work. Commanding officers in their respective areas
were those who often rendered justice. Churches and the civil society advised people not to seek
justice from the invaders because they would all lose. The traditional justice system is based on the
chief of the collectivity and his lieutenants in the groupings. When the traditional chief runs away from
his place for long and there are no clear channels of authority established, it is difficult for traditional
courts to operate. Alternate channels like churches and strong NGOs with recognised leadership in
villages become the rampart for justice. The justice system was most disturbed in areas in which
traditional chiefs were in danger and decided not to cooperate with the new regime. It is mostly after
the Sun City agreements in 2002 and the subsequent reunification of the state that traditional
structures began working again in matters concerning justice. In urban areas, however the system of
inter-ethnic consultation developed. In Uvira, matters concerning one group were discussed and
submitted to the other groups. Many cases were resolved through inter-community exchange using the
wise men of each group. This was reported in Uvira as well as in Baraka.
44 The person who did that would face ostracism as a collaborator, a treacherous and mean person, not
worth socialising with.
45 As one respondent put it, mob justice constitutes a response of the population to the state’s abdication
of its duties. Because of impunity, freedom of movement becomes senseless and dangerous. The
population takes matters in its own hands. When a person is presumed to be a bandit, or a thief, he
pays the price of a justice with no due process.
46 Mob justice during Mobutu’s era was checked and controlled. It could occur but not on a day-to-day
basis as is the case in Kenya. Bandits sent to prison did not return immediately to the villages and the
population felt more secure. In some areas, for example among the Barega, death by mob justice is
still rare. It remains a phenomenon contained in the cities for robbers. In villages, some persons
suspected of witchcraft could also be victims of such justice but it was uncommon during the colonial
and Mobutu eras because those who engaged in such actions were pursued and if arrested submitted
to justice. Impunity today in any case seems to depend on who is involved. However, it is recidivism
that makes the youth in urban areas decide to settle such problems themselves. 
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The provision of justice was already biased and corrupted during the reign of
President Mobutu and worsened during war. Warlords considered it their right to
rule and render justice on places they had under their control. The leader of any
militia could order punishment leading even to death for one person, a village or a
group of persons accused of anything, including collaboration, spying, providing
mystical powers, or some other kind of support to the enemy. The justice of the
conqueror was punitive, unilateral and with no appeal. 
For the population, a justice system in the hands of the enemy could only be
illegitimate and partial.43 The denial of justice and its de-legitimation led people to
renounce it. It was socially inimical to bring a case against a member of one’s
group before such a kind of justice.44 The community witnessed the development
of alternative forms of justice, some of which were indeed expeditious, and others
of which insisted on soft ways of ruling through reconciliation, mutual agreement
and arbitrage. 
Mob justice was exercised mostly in cases of armed robbery, killing with guns,
accusation of collaborating with the enemy or being a sorcerer. Most persons
interviewed see this practice as a revolt against prevailing impunity, especially
against seeing persons accused of high crimes being released on the streets
again and continuing to be threats to harmony in the community.45 When the state
doesn’t correctly perform its duties, people return to their own ways of getting
justice. This kind of justice did not stop with the end of war. It still goes on
unchecked.46
47 Many other NGOs have fostered alternative ways of getting justice in a similar manner in South Kivu.
They include APRODEPED OCET, JEREMIE, SARCAF, ADI KIVU, SOFIBEF, UPDI and the Life and
Peace Institute.
48 The Commission for Justice and Peace is operated by the Catholic Church throughout its entire
organisation. It and the Protestant Héritiers de la Justice (the Heirs of Justice) are examples of
mechanisms which evolved from churches and civil society and which were and still are backed by
numerous international charities in order to improve advocacy for neutral justice and the access of
neglected people to decent justice. 
49 Commissions for Justice and Peace are instituted in all parishes. The most common conflicts registered
through these commissions deal with landownership, debt default and suspicion of witchcraft.
50 As its name suggests, Héritiers de la Justice (the Heirs of Justice) is an NGO established by the
Protestant church in Kivu which specialises also in advocacy for human rights and justice, in
developing alternative ways of doing justice, in the training of the paramilitary and in assisting poor
victims and raped women in seeking justice by providing them lawyers and defenders at no cost. They
also organise training sessions, radio and television broadcasts, and teach courses on human rights in
primary schools in order to sensitise people about their rights and the judiciary system and to develop
their capacities to claim their rights.
They listen to victims and accompany them; they preach mutual arrangements instead of going to
justice, because, whether in the pre- as well as the post-war period, no one ever wins completely
when facing the formal judiciary service. With the help of ICCO, they also helped in the training of
Para jurists and they also run a programme against sexual violence and rape in some Methodist
medical centres in Nyundu and in Meru. 
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Alternative ways of curbing this kind of justice evolved from churches and civil
society.47 They all preach arbitration, negotiated arrangements and resolving
matters within the community. They consider that when issues are beyond their
ability, they can provide assistance and accompany the victims through the legal
procedures for getting justice.48 Catholic parishes organise on a permanent basis
subunits of the Commission on Justice and Peace.49 A number of protestant
churches also together instituted a local NGO to care for matters pertaining to
justice and human rights.50
In rural areas, some traditional chiefs continue to provide justice with limited
results by running traditional courts or the Baraza la Shirika, whereas in urban
communities the elected patriarchs of the community establish a committee of
wise persons who provide advice and judgment within their respective
communities and negotiate intra-communal settlements when a member of their
community has a grudge against a member of another. 
The case of Banyamulenge in Uvira is an illustration of this phenomenon. No
Munyamulenge, whether living in Uvira or coming directly from their area in the
mountains may go to court in Uvira, without seeking first the advice and the
judgement of the elders or other appointed persons. Apparently mutualitiés
control, orient and help their members during legal battles. They provide for
justice better than the magistrate and the magistrate often seeks their opinion
before rendering justice. 
51 There are tales, for example, of some former Maï Maï and the soldiers of the DRC from different ethnic
groups who joined the CNDP with the hope that future negotiations with the state would help them
advance. As in the political game during the transition, integrating the army and getting grades through
negotiations, and playing the political game to become a minister or a member of another corps through
the representation of a particular group, may bring peace but not for long or one that can be enforced. 
52 The policemen in the rural territories are almost non-existent. In Shabunda for example, there were
only four policemen stationed at the territory and they are absent elsewhere. In Kabare, there were
only two or three; and in Walungu we witnessed only one, who was very tired. It is easier to see a
soldier in villages rather than a policeman. Even in Nyangezi, 25 kilometres from Bukavu, there are no
policemen stationed as a group. The only police that are identified are the police regulating traffic
along main roads for obvious reasons. They are placed by their commanders from Bukavu or Uvira at
strategic points to harass drivers and to enrich their patrons. Police for security reasons are almost
non-existent. The national police is unified, centralised and directed from Kinshasa. Territorial
administrators and assistant administrators therefore rely mostly on individuals recruited out of
necessity and not recorded with the national administration of the police body. Definitely, there is a
vacuum in this area.
53 Flourishing at the end of the colonial era, mutualitiés of this kind were discouraged and definitely not
tolerated during the Mobutu era. It was only at the beginning of the democratisation process in 1989
and the calling of the national sovereign conference, that the power of mutualitiés was unleashed.
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6.4 The Congolese army (FARDC)
The Congolese army has been restructured to include the various militias which
fought during the civil war. This has not worked out well and I return to the subject
in the ‘Lessons Learned’ section below. For the present, note that communities or
their names have been exploited in the integration process by some individuals
whose personal ambitions were not satisfied in the new system of sharing power
and decided to manipulate or recruit followers in order to increase their bargaining
powers. The game of the advancement of a personal career through rebellion
may also explain the current survival of some Maï Maï groups in the plains, with
the tacit approval of politicians who may be located in Bukavu or in Kinshasa.51
6.5 Policing
The Congolese Police have not been subject to serious reform since the war and
its mandate prioritises the protection of the state rather than the population.52 In
any case it has always been thin on the ground in the rural areas, where Native
Administration police under the direction of the Bami and chiefs provided local
security. However, these forces are underfinanced, underpaid and ineffective now. 
The role of mutualitiés is important in policing and judging, and in bargaining with
other groups and outsiders, in matters pertaining to security and political
participation in the governance of the city or the town. When there are conflicts
between the citizens of different communities the leaders of the respective
mutualitiés negotiate a settlement. Tribal and ethnic mutualitiés in Bukavu are
associations based on ethnic cultural acquaintances in order to defend a certain
number of interests, among which representation and participation in the political
arena rank high. Mutualitiés in this respect may join into alliances with other
mutualitiés that share cultural ties, carry forward dialogue with other mutualitiés
and mobilise their communities about what is the correct line or behaviour to
develop during certain events.53
54 In terms of local politics, these mutualitiés end up regrouping in the most important axes: SBB (or
Solidarity of Bashi and Bahavu) and the LUSU-LEGA, particularly when it comes to designating the
Governor and the Vice Governor and the provincial ministers of his administration.
55 COBASKI: Collège des Bami et Autorités Traditionnelles du Sud Kivu.
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These mutualitiés in Bukavu comprise three kinds: mutualitiés representing
communities from other provinces, i.e. Congolese who do not consider themselves
as people of South Kivu: mutualitiés on ethnic lines, associating wider groups for
better political action, and mutualitiés representing villages or communities on a
spatial dimension. Among mutualitiés representing Congolese from elsewhere than
South Kivu, one may cite the following groups operating in Bukavu – the Yira
Community, representing the Banande, LUSADISU representing the Bakongo,
COMSHABA representing the community of people from Katanga, MONANO or
ALINABA, representing the alliance of Bangala from the Equator or elsewhere,
MUREMA, representing the association of persons from Maniema, MUKASUK,
representing the Baluba from Kasai, Mutuality Okapi, representing persons
originating from the Province Orientale (Kisangani), etc. Bukavu mutualitiés along
internal ethnic lines and sometimes along village groupings include, for example,
SHIKAMA, for the Banyamulenge, LUSU-LEGA for the Barega, EMO’ YA
M’MBONDO for the Babembe, MUHA for the Bahavu, the Mutuality of Babuyu,
BUGUMA for the Bafuliru, and Bashi Bahavu Solidarity (SBB). Mutualitiés
organised on a spatial dimension often aim at development objectives in their area
of origin while seeking at the same time representation in the larger ethnic group
when sharing whatever resources are provided to the entire community. In this
category are included, for example, CODELU (Committee for the development of
Luhwinja), MUREKA (Mutuality of people from Kasha), SINYA (the syndicate of
developmental initiatives in Nyangezi), ASEDEZWA (Association for the
development of the area of Walungu), SIKA (Syndicate for the Development of
Kaziba), ODILU (Organisation for the development of Luhihi), MUDEVOLAKI
(Mutuality for the development of populations living around Lake Kivu), UDEZOKA
(Union for the development of people from Kabare), SODEN MULANGANE
(Solidarity for the Development of Ngweshe), EREKA (Understanding for the
development of Kalehe), etc. Most of these mutualitiés are also all federated in one
association called COMUSKI, or the coordination of mutualitiés of South Kivu.
Some citizens like the Banyamulenge find protection by living in ethnically
homogeneous areas. In South Kivu, the organising of mutualitiés and their
activities reached a peak during the period of war (Mulotwa 2006).54
Traditional authorities felt also the need to speak out with one single voice, the
COBASKI,55 or the Assembly of Bami and other traditional authorities of South
Kivu. As a group they spoke out by organising conferences from which they would
issue statements and recommendations to de facto authorities on how to improve
relations with communities and also deliver messages to the international
community and even to the government of Kinshasa. Such organisations were
useful in convincing the population on what attitude to adopt in relation with the de
facto power of Rwanda during RCD, and who to blame in case of disorder.
Although most communities maintain a grudge against the Banyamulenge, people
have in their mind that the real enemy is still or was Rwanda, although it exploited
56 Although the war took a heavy toll on priests, nuns and three bishops, including the archbishop
Monsignor Munzihirwa, most priests remained in their parishes or left them only for a short time and
helped in resuming and continuing services which they had already been providing to the community.
The order of Munzihirwa to all members of the Catholic clergy whether European or local, that no
matter what happened they had to stay on duty and continue to help their parishes, was totally
obeyed. Abbeys and missionaries and nuns continued to serve the community, and the Church’s
external links were not broken. Maria Mason, a consecrated woman, did magnificent work maintaining
medical activities throughout the province and indirectly mobilised the aid of charity organisations
linked with the universal church, such as Misereor, CARITAS, Christian Relief Aid, and so on.
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the Banyamulenge who also suffered a lot in the confrontations. The purely local
conflicts (most importantly between the Babembe and the Banyamulenge) that
underpinned the larger international and national conflicts and gave them energy
and persistence have not been adequately addressed and help to fuel the larger
conflict still today (Autesserre 2010).
Although the populations disagree with atrocities which may be committed by their
resistance forces which refused integration in the army, they don’t share the
official idea of now labelling all resistance movements as negative. This is
perceived as ingratitude by the state, which was absent for a long time and could
not protect or defend the population against the enemy. Populations in the plain
and in the territory of Kalehe are awaiting the day when the government will
recognise the role various resistance movements played in destabilising the power
of Rwanda in South Kivu; the nation throughout Congo indeed contributed to save
the state, through the church and the civil society.
7 The recreation of human security:
lessons learned
7.1 Networked governance and the churches
Governance does not disappear when the state collapses. Its structures remain
hidden and in retreat, but ready to sprout into existence again. This is true for all
parts of government, but it is especially true for the structures of local and rural
governance. The consequence is that a post-conflict state has much more need
for decentralisation – as well as possibilities for achieving it. Multi-layered,
networked governance is a reality but it is much less of a threat to vital states than
might have been imagined. Citizens do not know how to access donor resources
themselves; generally they do so through the state or through their local churches.
The leadership of the Catholic Church during the war and then after seems to be one
of the most important institutions sustaining society, maintaining hope and helping in
the development of alternative channels for avoiding the oppressive official state and
working for the gradual renewal of the legitimate state. The organisation of the
Catholic Church transcends the boundaries of a particular country. From a parish in
Uvira, to Rwanda and Burundi, and from Bukavu to Kinshasa, Rome and the whole
world, messages of various kinds were sent and heard to sensitise the world about
the hell the Christians and populations of South Kivu were suffering.56
57 The Commission for Justice and Peace of the Catholic Church in Bukavu also helped in developing
alternative ways of providing justice by preaching negotiation and reconciliation between groups. It
recommended the avoidance of tribunals or temporary courts instituted by military groups. Instead they
helped their commissions at the parish level take over the process of settlement of issues through
mutual agreement and understanding instead of using a justice system which was oppressive, sided
with the one who offered most or the one who was ideologically favourable and tied to transitory power
holders. As one interviewer put it: ‘In matters of leadership, the Church operated in concert with the
other members of civil society. Coordination was ensured within the GRAPES: the Groupe de
Réflexion et d’Animation Politique, Economique et Sociale’. Programmes executed by the Bureau
Diocésain de Développement are mostly financed from the European Union, particularly by Catholic
organisations such as Misereor, CARITAS France, CARITAS Spain, CARITAS Geneva, and CARITAS
America. Most of them continued to finance these programmes during the war through missionary
accounts. The assistance of UNICEF and FAO also was provided for agricultural inputs. We also
cannot forget the assistance of Secours Catholique. Messages we wrote reached the world through
these channels. PAM also helped us many times in providing us food stocks which we distributed in
return to the population in need.’
58 The Church took an important lead on two services: the Diocesan Office for Medical Action (Bureau
Diocésain des Oeuvres Médicales – BDOM) maintained the health system controlled by the Church in
the name of the state and provided, without discrimination, assistance to all; and the Bureau Diocésain
de Development (BDD), sometimes in cooperation with other non-governmental associations, which
helped to carry on, small development activities that mobilised external assistance, and the labour of
the population, such as the provision of water, the building of schools, roads, etc. Another service
which provided assistance was CARITAS, which mobilised charitable assistance from within and
without to the country for the needy and marginalised groups.
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 74
32
Inside South Kivu, messages written by a civil society committee of reflection was
read through all the parishes, recommending the correct attitude people should
follow and the way they must behave in relation to the new power holders. Most of
the efficient networks that benefited communities in South Kivu came from the
networks of the church. 
Churches also served as an important channel for advocacy on human rights,
justice and democracy. They loudly voiced problems encountered by communities
and informed the world about the atrocities committed by various groups and all
that happened in the life of parishioners. The (Catholic) Commission for Justice
and Peace was the most vocal advocate of alternative means of restoring the
state and the necessity of taming the behaviour of the militias and armed groups.
Under its leadership, other NGOs and churches’ organisations such as the
(Protestant) ‘Héritiers de la Justice’ (Heirs of Justice) joined together to get the
voice of the person abandoned heard throughout the world and the nation.57
Churches have emerged as one of the most accessible and durable channels of
outside assistance to local communities. The church already played an important
role during war in the provision of basic services in education, running schools, in
health, managing hospitals, and in providing other services indirectly necessary to
its own deployment such as small airport runways in remote areas, roads leading
to churches and within the community, building dams and generating electricity via
solar energy for some schools, presbyteries, hospitals, maternity and nursing
centres, and pharmacies. Where it could reach or it was already present the
church therefore helped in the maintenance and creation of some basic
infrastructure, and served as the most important channel through which external
assistance was channelled to the population.58
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7.2 Local conflicts
The purely local conflicts that helped to fuel the larger conflict in the Great Lakes
region have been barely addressed as yet. MONUSCO has focused to date on
denying control of territory to the rebel militias and otherwise has not been actively
engaged in building the citizen foundations for peace in the area. MONUSCO is
an Anglophone operation in a Francophone country. When this is combined with
the six month tours of duty of MONUSCO soldiers and many of the senior civilian
staff, tools for understanding local complexities and conducting local peace
negotiations are lacking.
A key failing in the state reconstruction process in Kivu is that the purely local
conflicts (most importantly between the Babembe and the Banyamulenge) that
underpinned the larger international and national conflicts and gave them energy
and persistence, have not been addressed. 
The social contract between the state and society has largely been re-established
in Congo. Partly, this is due to the powerful negative lesson of what the alternative
represents. The suffering during the war was truly devastating and even today
welfare has not returned to pre-war levels. However, there are tensions that will
need to be addressed. Security Sector Reforms of the Congolese army and police
have not begun in the province, which means that they do not add to citizen
security. In fact the informal ceding of the army in Kivu to Rwandaphones is a
source of conflict and insecurity. 
Rwanda and/or Rwandaphones cannot be allowed by the international community
to become an army of occupation over the other groups. This will require
(i) a negotiated settlement between the Banyamulenge and Babembe that gives
security to both groups (together with a similar set of agreements in North Kivu),
(ii) followed by the return to an ethnically-balanced army. The latter will require
(a) the departure of non-Congolese Rwandan soldiers and a break in the link between
those who remain and Rwanda and (b) a more genuinely national posting process
for soldiers in the army. Point (i) (security for the Rwandaphones) is a prerequisite
to the others and that is why locally negotiated settlements are so important.
Granting Minembwe territory status on a permanent basis also should be put on
the agenda of settlement as well as the intensification of exchanges between the
Banyamulenge and other ethnic groups. It is important to open up roads toward the
mountains of Itombwe so that communication can flow easier. Changing methods
of farming may take longer but it may prove in the end a way of changing the
habits of isolation of Banyamulenge groups.
7.3 Rebuilding the formal state
A focus on rebuilding and financing the purely local aspects of governance should
consider the following actions: 
(i) enabling Bami, chiefs and Native Administration police to be functional and
to do without the revenues of the now discredited traditional courts (it is
unwise to rely upon an expanded national police force as it is clear that it is
resistant to reform.); and 
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(ii) providing adequate funds for the travel and functioning of the territorial
administration and magistrates.
Paying the wages of soldiers, policemen, magistrates and administrative officers
on a regular basis and improving them would diminish the burden the population
is enduring in having to take care of these groups. This would diminish corruption,
robbery, violence against the population and illegal taxation. It would improve the
professionalism of these institutions. It is a priority demand which was expressed
in almost all our interviews.
Elections are increasingly seen as a tool the population might use to voice their
demands to the polity. Even several Maï Maï leaders seemed to be planning to
contest for provincial and national offices in the November 2011 elections. They
are trying to do grass roots organising in order to gain seats at the local, national
and state levels of representation rather than trusting politicians from Kinshasa
again. The outcomes of the incoming elections will be important to analyse.
The Congolese army has been restructured to include the various militias which
fought during the civil war. This has become a major problem in the Kivu
provinces, as the Rwandaphones who were incorporated refused to be posted
outside their home provinces, while the soldiers from the other groups were sent
elsewhere. This has left an overwhelmingly Rwandaphone Congolese army in
Kivu. The other ethnic groups see this force as a foreign, Rwandan army of
occupation. The resulting hostility between the army and those whom it ostensibly
protects has created some army atrocities against the locals and has led to
petitions in some areas for the army to leave. In short the army is seen as a
predator and not a protector by the non-Rwandaphones. Overall none among
these groups feel completely secured by the army of the state. It is rather a
source of insecurity. Clashes of the Maï Maï Yakutumba against the governmental
army, and clashes of the Ngumino Banyamulenge against the Congolese army
are more likely to occur nowadays than clashes between both cited groups.
8 Conclusion
Life during the absence of a real state in South Kivu was precarious; economic
activities were disturbed and poverty became severe. People living in a state of
precariousness are more concerned with themselves and are less cooperative.
They are prone to conflicts and are easily exploited by external forces. 
Despite the end of violent confrontations, and the return of a more peaceful state in
numerous areas, the situation in South Kivu remains volatile and filled with suspicion.
The behaviour of many groups is determined by the fear that another cycle of war by
Rwanda is in the making, with the aim of separating North Kivu and South Kivu from
Congo, and that steps to this end are already being taken through subtle political and
administrative manoeuvring as well as economic and military infiltration. 
This threat makes all groups feel uneasy, fearful and suspicious against one
another. Local communities believe strongly that South and North Kivu are
evolving under the imperialism of Rwanda, and that the Banyamulenge in South
Kivu and other Tutsi in North Kivu may again constitute a Trojan horse.
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This affects also the vision that communities have regarding current international
and national institutions. The army and other security organisations are distrusted
and considered to be controlled by Rwandans through the Banyamulenge. The
police are not deployed in rural areas, and therefore the security of the population
is threatened constantly. 
Although the presence of MONUSCO is helpful, its deployment also is sometimes
associated with complicity. Yet no one wants MONUSCO to leave South Kivu.
People instead want it to be more committed and to improve its methods of
protecting the local population and fighting against infiltration.
With regard to lessons learned from Kivu, as long as unemployment remains
severe, the army continues to be unevenly controlled, undisciplined, underpaid
and unable to protect local communities, civil servants are left in miserable
conditions, and uncontrolled militias from within and neighbouring countries
control large portions of Congolese land, security will remain precarious and
justice partial in South Kivu.
When the state is totally incapable of assuring the security of its own population
against external threats, when its own protective services engage in arbitrary
activities and live off the people, and when impunity goes unchecked, it is difficult
for social mechanisms and local institutions alone to substitute for the lack of a
decisive body capable of assuming the role of the leviathan.
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Annex DRC South Kivu Province 
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Glossary
ADI KIVU Association for the Integral Development of Kivu, a local
NGO specialised in agriculture and community rural
activities
AFDL Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo:
A circumstantial politico military coalition of dissident
groups with foreign backing, which launched the
1996–1997 war and was successful at toppling Mobutu
Sese Seko and bringing Laurent Désiré Kabila to power
ANR National Intelligence-gathering Agency
APRODEPED     Association for the Promotion of Peace and Development,
a local NGO
ASEDEZWA Association for the Development of the Area of Walungu 
AVSI              Italian Volunteers for Development Association
BDD  The Diocesan Office of Development. Since 1965 it has
operated like an NGO in promoting developmental
activities. Some of its programmes include the promotion
of gender activities (Centre Olame), the training of
children in acquiring various skills (CFJ) the care of
children accused of witchcraft (Foyer Ek’Abana), the care
of street children, the fight against illiteracy, provision of
water, and craft production
BDOM The Diocesan Office for Medical Action, an office of the
Archdiocese of Bukavu in charge of planning,
organisation and coordination of health activities in the
diocese. The BDOM supports health zones covered and
managed by the Catholic Church in South Kivu
BUGUMA Mutuality for the Bafuliru
CADECO Caisse Générale d'Epargne du Congo/Congolese
National Savings Institution
CARITAS A charitable organisation of the Catholic Church with
international and national branches. It mobilises charitable
assistance from within and from without the country and
channels its assistance to needy and marginalised groups
CNDP People’s Defence National Congress: The CNDP was an
armed militia group in Nord Kivu, after President Kabila
rose to power in 2002, basically for the defence of the Tutsi
ethnic group alleging that they were suffering discrimination
and that President Kabila did not respect the Sun City
agreements. It was perceived during the transitional period
as an emanation and a continuation of the RCD so as to 
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CNDP (cont.) maintain Kigali’s control of North and South Kivu. The
CNDP’s leader, Laurent Nkundabatware, threatened on
numerous occasions to conquer the cities of Goma and
Bukavu. He was able in 2004 to occupy Bukavu, alleging
he was coming to the rescue of the Banyamulenge. In the
face of revolt by the population and pressure by
MONUSCO, he backed down from this occupation. Internal
dissension or mutiny in the CNDP and pressure from the
Congolese army led Nkundabatware to flee to Rwanda
where allegedly he was put under house arrest. The CNDP
no longer exists, but its troops were used to form the core
of the Amani Leo operation which was launched in 2009 to
fight against negative forces, i,e., other local militia which
did not adhere to the Goma agreements after peace talks.
It is under this new label that they are spreading not only to
North Kivu but also in South Kivu
CNS National Security Council
COBASKI Assembly of Traditional Authorities and Chiefs in South Kivu
CODELU Committee for the Development of Luhwinja
COMSHABA Mutuality representing the community of people from
Katanga
COMUSKI The Coordination of Mutualitiés of South Kivu
COPARE Council for Peace and Reconciliation
DGM General Direction of Migrations 
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
DSRP Document of Strategies for the Reduction of Poverty
EMO’ YA M’MBONDO Mutuality for the Babembe
EREKA Understanding for the development of Kalehe
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FARDC Congolese army 
FRF Federalist and Republican Forces, Ngumino Forces for
the Defence of Banyamulenge
GRAPES Reflection and Animation Group for Political, Economic
and Social Action: A thinking group created under the
leadership of the Catholic Church and regrouping local
NGOs to formulate messages during the Rwandan
occupation under RCD about the proper behaviour to
adopt when living with other groups. Their messages
were read as sermons in parishes all over the province of
South Kivu
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Groupe JEREMIE (Jeremiah Group). A local Christian-oriented NGO
specialising in the defence of human rights
ICCO Inter Church Organisation for Cooperation and
Development, a Dutch Protestant NGO that combines
funds donated from various churches to finance
developmental activities including the promotion of justice
and human rights and dignity
IRC International Rescue Committee 
LUSADISU Mutuality representing the Bakongo
LUSU-LEGA Mutuality for the Barega
MONANO (or ALINABA). Mutuality representing the alliance of
Bangala from the Equator or elsewhere
MONUC United Nation Mission for Peace Keeping in DRC. It was
established in July 1999 under UN resolution1279. It
muted into MONUSCO in 2010.
MONUSCO United Nation Mission for the Stabilisation in Congo. It was
created following resolution 1925, taken in 2010 by the UN,
to pursue the mission conducted previously by MONUC.
MONUSCO emphasises the protection of civilians.
MUDEVOLAKI Mutuality for the development of populations living around
Lake Kivu
MUHA Mutuality for the Bahavu
MUKASUK Mutuality representing the Baluba from Kasai
MUREKA Mutuality of people from Kasha
MUREMA Mutuality representing the association of persons from
Maniema
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
OCET Community Work for the Education of All
ODILU Organization for the Development of Luhihi
ONATRA Office National des Transports/Congolese National
Transport Agency
RASTA A gang which organised the reign of terror in the territory
of Walungu, precisely in the areas of Kaniola and Nindja
in the territory of Kabare for many years from 2002 to
2008 and beyond. It was a heterogeneous group
composed of renegade soldiers from the Interahamwe
and from other groups like the Maï Maï and Mudundu 40,
who instead of integrating into the army conducted gang
activities with accomplices among civilians in villages
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RCD Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie 
RPF Rwanda Patriotic Front
SARCAF Service for the Support and Building of Self Promotion
Capacities of Women, a local NGO
SBB Bashi Bahavu Solidarity
SHIKAMA Mutuality for the Banyamulenge
SIKA Syndicate for the Development of Kaziba
SINYA The syndicate of developmental initiatives in Nyangezi 
SODEN MULANGANE Solidarity for the Development of Ngweshe
SOFIBEF Solidarity of Women of Fizi for Family Well Being, a local
NGO
UDEZOKA Union for the development of people from Kabare
UPDI Peasant Union for Integral Development, a local NGO
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Security in an Africa of Networked,
Multilevel Governance
A Research Councils of the UK Global Uncertainties Fellowship
This research programme centres on how the various institutions responsible for
the production of security and the management of conflict in Sub-Saharan African
societies do, could and should evolve in response to the presence of violent
conflict or criminality. The programme is built on the observation that all
governance (especially in Africa) is multileveled and networked –  from the village
to the international organisation, and well beyond what is specified in formal
government structures. Thus the focus is not only on the ways in which key
conflict-management institutions evolve themselves but also on the changing
ways in which the networks in which they are embedded actually operate. 
The programme researchers are: David K. Leonard (director) together with
Jeremy Allouche, Niagale Bagayoko-Penone, Peter Houtzager, Sidibe Kalilou,
Freida M’Cormack, Ferdinand Mugumo Mushi, Thierry Mayamba Nlandu,
Mohamed Samantar, Anna Schmidt, James Vincent, and Patrick Zadi Zadi.
Countries in which field research has been or will be conducted are: Democratic
Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone,
and Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland).
The objective of the research is the identification of institutional strategies for
recovering the multiple aspects of human security in countries that have been
fractured by violent conflict.
Key questions the programme seeks to answer are:
? How do conflict management institutions evolve under the stress of prolonged
violent conflict and how can they best contribute to the recovery of human
security? Institutions under consideration include elections, elected and
traditional local government, local courts, the police, and the armed services.
? What are the networks of relationships within and between states,
communities, NGOs, international organisations, and international donors for
the management and resolution of intrastate conflicts and how might their
effectiveness be improved?
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Bagayoko-Penone (2010) Multi-level Governance and Security: The Security
Sector Reform Process in the Central African Republic, IDS Working Paper 351,
Brighton: IDS
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